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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Draper City (hereinafter *City') challenges the
Defendant's claim the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
in this matter.

Jurisdiction of this appeal is governed by

Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120(7), eff. April 30, 2001.
This case is an appeal from a Third District Court's
Judgment in a trial de novo from Draper Justice Court.
Therefore, the above statutory scheme applies to appellate
review.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW
In summary, Defendant challenges his conviction in the
Draper Justice Court and the Third District Court for the
traffic offense of a stop sign violation.

Defendant

inappropriately claims the City may not amend an Information
alleging the traffic offense from a Class *Cf Misdemeanor to
an Infraction.
The Defendant is also in error that the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction to review the Third District Court's
decision.
1.

The Court of Appeals Jurisdiction Is Limited to
Reviewing District Court Rulings on the
Constitutionality of a Statute or Ordinance.
1

The standard of review for cases originating from
Justice Courts is found in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737
P.2d 981, 982 (Utah 1987), Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065,
1066 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
2* - The District Court Rulings Denying Discovery, a
Jury Trial for an Infraction, and Refusing to
Recuse the Trial Judge, Are Not Reviewable.
The standard of review for District Court decisions that
involve a constitutional issue on a procedural matter is
governed by Kanab v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) and City of St. George v. Smith, 814 P.2d 1154,
1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
3.

In the Event Defendant Can Establish This Court's
Jurisdiction, This Appeal Is Governed by West
Valley City, v. McDonald.

Should this Court determine it has jurisdiction to
review the District Court's verdict, the appropriate review
is identical to West Valley City, v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutes that are determinative of this appeal are:
Utah Code Annotated §78-5-120(2001),Appeals from
justice court - Trial or hearing de novo in district
court.
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may
not be appealed unless the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case originated in the Draper Justice Court with a
traffic citation for a stop sign violation issued to the
Defendant. (R.l)
bench trial.

The Defendant was found guilty after a

The Defendant was sentence with the

standardized fine of $60.00.

He made a timely appeal to the

Third District Court, Sandy Division.
A trial de novo occurred on March 13, 2001.

After a

bench trial, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to
a $60.00 fine.

Defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial

(R.96) (the timeliness of the Motion is disputed)1 and the
same was denied by the District Court on April 30, 2001.
(R.102-4)

The Defendant filed this appeal on May 7,

2001.(R.105)
Course of the Proceedings
The Draper City Ordinances adopted the state traffic
code as the traffic code for the City.

1

Pursuant to those

The City does not stipulate that Defendant's Motion for New
Trial is filed in a timely manner. Without argument, the City
will submits the matter to the Court of Appeals. Whereas the
Defendant's Certificate of Service (R.97) differs with the
District Court's Ruling (R.102) and in an effort to avoid a
remand for further findings, the City avers the absence of
jurisdiction to hear the appeal will ultimately control the case.

3

ordinances the Defendant received a traffic citation on May
5, 2000 for failing to stop at a stop sign in violation of
41-6-72(10). (R.l) Mr. Barlow requested a formal information
on May 19, 2000, prior to entering a plea.(R.4-5) On June 2,
2000 an Information was filed and a new arraignment was
scheduled for June 13, 2001.(R.7-8,6)
The Information amended the Class

y

C

Misdemeanor to an

Infraction, by inter lineation from the Justice Court Judge.
(R.7-8,25,54) The Defendant also sought from the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office various documents pursuant to a
Subpoena Duces Tecum. (R.27) The Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office moved to quash the request (R. 31) which
was ultimately granted by the Justice Court.
A bench trial was held and at the request of the
Defendant, the Justice Court viewed the intersection in
issue.

The defendant was found guilty (R.42) and fined

$60.00 (R.50)
The Defendant appealed to the Third District Court,
Sandy Division.

The Defendant again asserted his claim for

a jury trial (R.65), more discovery (R.63-4), and ultimately
requested the Trial Court Judge to recuse herself. (R.76)
These issues were reviewed prior to the first scheduled
4

trial date, and denied. (R.65,78,81-3)
A bench trial was held on March 13, 2001.

The City

presented one witness, the citing officer. (R.91-2) The
defense did not offer any witnesses.(R. 91-2,Tr.21) Upon the
conclusion of evidence, the Defendant was found guilty.
(R.92) The Defendant requested sentencing be set over and
the same occurred on March 27th.

At that time, the Defendant

received a $60.00 fine.
The Defendant's pleadings for a New Trial asserts he
served the same on April 6th, (R.96-7) within the ten (10)
days required by the Rule 24(a) Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The City has no knowledge why the Defendant's pleadings
bear a filing date of April 23rd.

For the purpose of this

brief, the City will assume the Notice of Appeal is timely.
A decision in favor of the City's position that the Court of
Appeals has no jurisdiction would finalize the matter
without regard to the timeliness of the Appeal.
Trial Court Disposition
On April 30, 2001, the District Court denied the
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (R.102-3) and affirmed
the conviction as an Infraction.
5

The District Court imposed

the same sentence as the Draper Justice Court, a $60.00
fine.

The Defendant filed this appeal on May 7, 2001.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The above recitation of the Course of Proceedings and
Trial Court Disposition provide the relevant facts on
appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellate jurisdiction over cases originating in Justice
Courts is limited by the Utah Code Annotated §78-5120(7)(2001).

This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have

repeatedly held only District Court rulings upon the
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute are subject to
further review.

Otherwise, all District Court findings are

final.
The Defendant herein has challenged his conviction on a
traffic offense.

He neither preserved a constitutional

issue at the trial court nor did the District Court rule
upon the constitutionality of an Ordinance.

Therefore, this

Court should dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
In the alternative should the Court believe judicial
review is appropriate, the Utah Court of Appeals previously
reviewed and denied the identical claims presented by
6

defendant herein, in West Valley City, v. McDonald, 948 P.2d
371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

In McDonald, the Court summarily

dismissed the Defendant's claim regarding his constitutional
right to a jury trial.
Finally, the facts as presented in this appeal do not
attach the right of a jury trial.

Whereas the Draper

Justice Court tried the case and imposed no jail, the
District Court could not impose any greater punishment on
appeal.

Therefore, whatever error the defendant could

sustain on appeal, the error is harmless.

Based upon the

Draper Justice Court sentence to only a fine, incarceration
was prohibited on appeal.

Therefore, the worst possible

sentence from his trial de novo in the District Court would
be a $60.00 fine.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL DO NOT VEST APPELLATE
JURISDICTION.
SUBPOINT A
ONLY DISTRICT COURT RULINGS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
STATUTE OR ORDINANCES ARE REVIEWABLE.
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
held appellate jurisdiction is limited regarding cases
7

originating in the Justice Courts.

This anailysis is upheld

by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120(7), eff.
2001.
(7) The decision of the district court is final and may
not be appealed unless the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
In reviewing this statute, the Utah Supreme Court held
in City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah
1990) that:
This simply recognizes the well-settled principle that
it is within the legislature's prerogative to define
court's appellate jurisdiction over decisions from any
lower court so long as such jurisdiction is not
expressly prohibited by the state constitution,
(citations omitted) at 518.
This Court has also similarly held in several dismissals
of appeals of a de novo review.

State v. Hinson 966 P.2d

273, 276 (Utah Ct. App 1998) upheld dismissing an appeal
from a trial de novo.

In Hinson, the Utah Court of Appeals

dismissed the appeal even though the defendant claimed the
District Court erred in denying certain discovery to the
defendant.
In City of Monticello v. Christiansen, 769 P.2d 853, 855
Utah Ct. App. 1989) this Court dismissed a trial de novo
conviction in the face of the defendant's inarticulate claim
that his traffic violation was unconstitutionally applied to
him.
8

City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981, 982 (Utah 1987)
held that defendant's claim that a driver's license was an
unconstitutional infringement upon his right to travel was
not sufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction in light of
the plain language of the statute, redes. Utah Code Ann.
§78-5-120(7) (2001) .
In the case at bar, the defendant never challenged a
statute or ordinance.

The defendant's main complaint is

against the procedure permitting the prosecutor to reduce
the traffic offense from a class yC
Infraction.

Misdemeanor to an

He made a bare reference to that issue in the

Draper Justice Court and in the District Court.
His second complaint is that full discovery was not
provided to him prior to trial.

It appears from the

appellant's brief he primarily complains of not receiving a
Bill of Particulars.

What is obviously omitted from

Appellant's discovery complaints is how the ^Information' i
deficient or confusing in regard to the traffic offense of
stop sign violation.

Both the Justice Court and the

District Court reviewed these claims and found them to be
without merit.(R.54,65)
In the absence of a ruling on the constitutionality of

statute, this Court should dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction.
SUBPOINT B
DEFENDANT'S SIMILAR CLAIMS OF ERROR ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Although the defendant arguably claims his
constitutional rights were violated by the trial de novo
process, such claims fail to establish appellate
jurisdiction.

As already noted, the Utah appellate courts

have consistently refused to review de novo trial appeals
unless a specific constitutional ruling validated or
challenged a statute or ordinance.

The Utah Courts have

dismissed appeals claiming constitutional errors on a Motion
to Suppress, Kanab v. Guskey 965 P.2d 1065, 1066 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998); refusal of the District Court to declare a
parking ordinance unconstitutional, Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Leahy, 848 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); or an
erroneous ruling regarding pretrial discovery, State v.
Hinson 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App 1998).
Although Defendant herein may claim these alleged
procedural errors rise to a constitutional deprivation, the
same is still non-reviewable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-

10

5-120(7) (2001), also see City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d
981, 982 (Utah 1987) .
As for the Defendant's claim the Trial Judge failed to
recuse herself, the record clearly shows the matter was
reviewed by the Presiding Judge, Robin W. Reese.(R.82)

This

issue also fails to meet the procedural or substantive basis
for appellate review.
As for the merits of the matter, the Defendant fails to
differentiate between receiving unfavorable pretrial rulings
with the alleged bias against the defendant.

The record is

void of such bias.
SUBPOINT C
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT BELIEVES APPELLATE REVIEW IS
APPROPRIATE, WEST VALLEY CITY V. MCDONALD, CONTROLS THE
ISSUE.
Should this Court believe reviewing this case is
appropriate, the same issues were determined by West Valley
City, v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Addendum, A)

(See

In that case, a defendant with the assistance

of counsel, claimed that the City Prosecutor did not have
the authority to reduce a speeding charge from a Class
Misdemeanor to an ^Infraction'.

y

C

The Utah Court of Appeals

found that such a reduction was not a violation of the
federal constitution in that no right to jury trial attaches
11

to petty crimes (less than six months potential jail). At
374.
The Utah Court of Appeals further found that the
defendant did not preserve the Utah State Constitutional
right simply by making a claim at the lower court.
deficiency lies in the case at bar.

The same

Although the Defendant

did claim his Utah State Constitutional right to a jury
trial,(R.22-3) his total argument is contained in the
following:
7. The case of West Valley City v. McDonald is
clearly distinguishable from this case by the Utah Court
of Appeals analysis as follows: [Quotation omitted]
8. The defendant in this case is raising a state
constitutional argument at the trial court on the state
level, and therefore, an analysis in the Utah Court of
Appeals would be under the Utah State Constitution not
under the Federal Constitution. (R.22-3)
The Utah Court of Appeals has previously established
what constitutes ^raising a constitutional question'.

In

State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this
Court followed the long held analysis that mere mention is
not sufficient to preserve a Utah State Constitutional
claim.

In Dudley, the Defendant, with the assistance of

counsel, made mention of his State Constitutional claim in
support of his motion to suppress.

However, the Utah Court

of Appeals made the following observation at 42 6.
12

Although the appellants assert their state
constitutional rights have been violated, they failed to
develop any meaningful argument under the Utah
Constitution. Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides: *The argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, with citation to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied o n / Mere allusion to state constitutional
claims, unsupported by meaningful analysis, does not
permit appellate review. (Citations omitted) "Moreover,
the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation
is before the trial court, not ...for the first time on
appeal." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)
In the instant case, Mr. Barlow omitted any citations to
any cases supporting his proposition at either trial court
below.

He omits any analysis why the Utah State

Constitution right to a jury trial attached in his case.
Mr. Barlow further omitted any analysis of this claim in
Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, p.10).

In summary,

Mr. Barlow's bare citation to the state constitution is not
a ^thoughtful and probing analysis' as required in Bobo, id.
and Dudley, id.
SUBPOINT D
IN THIS CASE, THE DEFENDANT SUFFERED ZERO RISK OF
INCARCERATION, AND THEREFORE HAD NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
Once the Draper Justice Court limited the Defendant's
sentence to a fine, it precluded any possibility of
13

incarceration.

As in all appeals, the District Court herein

was limited to impose no more harsh sentences than imposed by
the Justice Court.

Since sentencing was limited to a fine,

($60.00) the District Court on a de novo trial is limited to
a fine not to exceed $60.00.

Therefore, no possibility of

incarceration existed after the Draper Justice Court imposed
sentence on the Infraction.
Therefore, without a risk of depriving the defendant of
his liberty, no right to jury trial attached at the District
Court level.

The defendant/s claim of a constitutional

right to a jury trial simply became moot upon sentencing at
the Draper Justice Court.
CONCLUSION
Appellate review of a trial de novo case originating in
Justice Courts is traditionally limited to constitutional
challenges.

Such a challenge must attack a statute or

ordinance and does not include alleged procedural defects in
the progression of the case.
Should this Court choose to pursue an analysis of the
Defendant's claims, that analysis is controlled by West
Valley City v. McDonald, id.

This Court has already ruled

on the identical issues presented in the case at bar.
14

Ultimately, no matter what analysis may be appropriate,
the defendant's claims are rendered moot by the sentence
imposed at the Justice Court level.

Once a fine was

imposed, the defendant could not suffer any deprivation of
liberty in a subsequent trial de novo or other appeal.
Therefore, Mr. Barlow's real claim for a jury trial never
attached after receiving his sentence of $60.00.
The Defendant's appeal should be summarily dismissed.
Dated this

_>/^l„_ day of November, 2001.

^T G. CUTLER
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellee

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, by
first class mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, on this /dT
day of November, 2001, to Matthew I. Barlow, at 12624 South
Whisper Brook Way, Draper, Utah 84120.
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PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE' S
ADDENDUM A

WEST VALLEY CITY V. MCDONALD
948 P.2D 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

17

WEST PALLET CITY v. McDONALD

Utah 371

Cite as 948 P.2d 371 (UtahApp. 1997)

229. In Mesa's case a disconnection action
would not be merely "a substitute procedure
for attacking an annexation." Id. Rather, it
would air Mesa's grievance in a forum that,
unlike the current annexation challenge, is
explicitly designed to allow public debate on
the policy implications of altering established
city boundaries.
In sum, the principles of statutory construction require us to presume that the
Legislature used the terms "property owner"
and "resident" advisedly to describe two distinct categories of potential plaintiffs under
the annexation statute. See Cottonwood City
Electors, 28 Utah 2d at 124, 499 P.2d at 272.
We conclude the Legislature did not contemplate that "residents" under section 10-2-423
would include nonresident property owners.
On the contrary, Mesa's claim—in which the
absentee owner of a single undeveloped lot
raises procedural defects to invalidate the
annexation of an entire residential neighborhood—is clearly preempted by the statute's
plain language. We conclude that, based on
the presumption of validity in section 10-2423, Sandy City's annexation of Mesa's property was valid.
CONCLUSION
The 1997 amendments to the annexation
statute do not apply retroactively to Sandy
City's 1993 annexation of Mesa's property,
and thus Mesa's claims are not moot. However, Mesa is not a resident of the annexed
area under section 10-2-422 and cannot overcome that section's conclusive presumption of
valid annexation. Sandy City's annexation of
Mesa's property is therefore valid regardless
of any procedural defect.
GREENWOOD, J., concurs.
ORME, J., concurs in the result.

WEST VALLEY CITY, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Caree F. McDONALD, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 960471-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah
Nov. 14, 1997.
Motorist was convicted, in the Third District Court, West Valley Department, Carlos
A. Esqueda, Judge pro tern., of speeding
infraction. Motorist appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) trial court
did not abuse its discretion by fining motorist
$60 for speeding, rather than $50 as recommended in Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule; (2)
reduction of speeding charge against motorist from class C misdemeanor to infraction
did not deny federal constitutional right to
trial by jury; (3) reduction of speeding
charge did not violate state statutory right to
trial by jury; (4) reduction of speeding
charge did not violate rule of criminal procedure; and (5) reduction of speeding charge
did not violate statutory requirement of uniform enforcement of traffic laws.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law <3=>586
District court does not abuse its discretion in denying continuance unless denial was
arbitrary or unreasonable.
2. Automobiles <s=>359
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
by fining motorist $60 for speeding, rather
than $50 as recommended in Uniform Fine/
Bail Schedule; motorist failed to show trial
court's act was inherently unfair, that fine
was clearly excessive, or that no reasonable
person would accept trial court's decision.
U.C JL1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-301.5(5).
3. Indictment and Information <®=>162
Reduction of speeding charge against
motorist from class C misdemeanor to infraction did not charge motorist with additional

372
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or different offense, in violation of rule of
criminal procedure; only classification and
penalty for speeding offense was changed.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-204(3), 76-3301(l)(e); Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 4(d).
4. Jury <3=>22(1), 31.3(1)
Reduction of speeding charge against
motorist from class C misdemeanor to infraction did not deny motorist's statutory right to
jury trial for misdemeanor, and thus did not
violate rule of criminal procedure by prejudicing motorist's substantial rights; once motorist was charged with infraction, she could
no longer be punished by imprisonment and
no longer had statutory right to jury trial.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-46, 76-3-204(3), 76-3301(l)(e), 77-l-6(2)(e); Rules Crim.Proc.,
Rule 4(d).
5. Jury ®=>22(1)
Constitutional right to jury trial is triggered by type of punishment defendant
faces. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
6. Jury <8=>22(1), 31.3(1)
Reduction of speeding charge against
motorist, from class C misdemeanor carrying
possible jail penalty to infraction that could
not be punished by imprisonment, did not
violate statutory right to jury trial; trial
court, by accepting amended information before trial, in effect agreed not to consider jail
time as possible sentence for speeding violation, so trial court was no longer required
under Utah law to grant motorist's request
for jury trial. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-46, 76-3204(3), 76-3-301(l)(e), 77-l-6(2)(e); Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 4(d).

prison term, for which defendant has no federal constitutional right to jury trial
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6; U.C.A.1953, 77-16(2)(e).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions

9. Criminal Law <s=>1030(2)
Defendant failed to properly raise state
constitutional issue before trial court, and
Court of Apioeals would not consider state
constitutional claims; none of defendant's motions before trial court referred to constitutional argument, that Utah statute denying
right to jury trial for infraction violates Utah
Constitution because Constitution provides
for jury trial in all criminal proceedings, nor
was argumert raised in trial court proceedings for which Court of Appeals had transcripts. Const. Art. 1, § 12; U C.A.1953, 77l-6(2)(e).
10. Criminal Law <s=>1030(2)
When appellant does not brief state constitutional arj^ument below, Court of Appeals
will not address it, but rather will analyze
alleged violation under Federal Constitution.
11. Jury <e=>22(l)
Defendant charged with petty offense
has no federal constitutional right to jury
trial. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 6.
12. Criminal Law <S=>27
Legislature's determination that offense
carries maximum prison terms of six months
or less indicates its view that offense is "petty."

7. Indictment and Information <&=>161(1)
Statute requiring enforcement of traffic
laws uniformly throughout the state did not
address issue of whether trial court may
allow information charging defendant with
speeding violation to be amended from misdemeanor to infraction. U.C.A.1953, 41-616.

13. Jury &=>22(1>
Infractions and class C misdemeanors
are "petty" offenses for which defendant has
no federal constitutional right to jury trial;
infractions carry no prison term under Utah
law, and class C misdemeanors carry maximum prison term of six months or less.
U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 6.

8. Jury <3>22(1)
Utah statute denying right to jury trial
for infraction does not violate right to jury
trial guaranteed under Federal Constitution;
infractions are "petty" offenses carrying no

Michael A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for
Defendant and Appellant.
J. Richard Catten, West Valley City, for
Plaintiff and Appellee.
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Before DAVIS, P.J., WILKINS, Associate
P.J., and BILLINGS, J.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Caree F. McDonald appeals
from a conviction of exceeding the speed
limit in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-646 (Supp.1997). We affirm.
FACTS
McDonald received notice that West Valley
City (the City) was charging her with a
speeding violation, based on "photo radar,"
for traveling fifty-one miles per hour in a
forty mile-per-hour zone. The notice stated
bail was fifty-seven dollars. Counsel for McDonald subsequently entered a notice of appearance and a request for jury trial.
The City filed an information formally
charging McDonald with exceeding the^ posted speed by eleven miles per hour, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of section 41-6-46.
After the case was set for a bench trial,
McDonald again requested a jury trial. The
City then filed an amended information containing the same speeding charge against
McDonald, but stating the violation was an
infraction rather than a class C misdemeanor.
On the day of trial, the court heard arguments on McDonald's motion and denied
both her request for a jury trial and for a
continuance, but agreed to sentence McDonald only to the penalties appropriate for
an infraction. Trial proceeded, and McDonald was found guilty as charged. The
trial court sentenced McDonald to pay a
sixty dollar fine and attend traffic school.
1. McDonald also asserts the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance.
McDonald has failed to show the denial was
unreasonable or arbitrary, as required by Utah
law. See State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530
(Utah Ct.App.1997). We therefore find no abuse
of discretion.
McDonald further contends the trial court
abused its discretion by fining her $60 rather
than $50 as recommended in the Uniform Fine/
Bail Schedule. Because McDonald fails to show

ANALYSIS
[1,2] McDonald argues on appeal that
when the trial court allowed the City to
reduce the speeding violation charge from a
class C misdemeanor to an infraction, the
trial court violated Rule 4(d) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure because reducing the charge deprived McDonald of her
statutory right to a jury trial. McDonald
further argues the City does not have the
authority under Utah law to change the classification of a speeding violation from a class
C misdemeanor to an infraction. In addition,
McDonald argues Utah Code Ann. § 77-16(2)(e) (1995), which does not allow jury trials
for defendants charged with an infraction,
violates Utah's constitution.1
I. Rule 4(d)
[3,4] A trial court may allow the prosecution to amend a charge against a defendant
at any time before the defendant is convicted
"if no additional or different offense is
charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced."
Utah
R.Crim. P. 4(d). The original information
charging McDonald classified the violation as
a class C misdemeanor, which is punishable
by a maximum of ninety days imprisonment
and a $750 fine. See Utah Code Ann. § 763-204(3) (1995). The amended information
classified McDonald's violation as an infraction, which is punishable by a maximum fine
of $750. See id. § 76-3-301 (l)(e). Utah law
provides for a jury trial for criminal defendants except when charged with an infraction. See id. § 77-l-6(2)(e); Utah R.Crim.
P. 17(d).
The charge in the amended information—
speeding in violation of section 41-6-46—was
exactly the same as in the original informathe trial court's act was "inherently unfair," that
the fine was "clearly excessive," or that no reasonable person would accept the trial court's
decision, State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120
(Utah Ct.App.1995), we find no abuse of discretion. See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301.5(5)
(1995) ("This [uniform fine schedule] does not
prohibit the court from in its discretion imposing
no fine, or a fine in any amount up to and
including the maximum fine, for the offense.")
We do not address McDonald's other arguments as they are meritless.
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tion; only the classification, and therefore
the penalty, was changed. Thus, no additional or different offense was charged in violation of Rule 4(d). However, McDonald argues amending the information violated a
substantial right—her right to a jury trial—
because Utah law provides for a jury trial
when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e)
(1995). Thus, according to McDonald,
amending the information stripped her of her
right to a jury trial under section 77-16(2)(e) because once she was charged with an
infraction, she no longer could request a jury
trial under the statute.

before trial, the trial court in effect agreed
not to consider jail time as a possible sentence for McDonald. The trial court's pretrial decision not to impose jail time and
thereby eliminate McDonald's right to a jury
trial is analogous to a trial court's pretrial
decision not to impose jail time, thereby eliminating the defendant's right to appointed
counsel. The United States Supreme Court
has held that a defendant may be tried without appointed counsel so long as that defendant is not sentenced to jail. See Scott u
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1158,
1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979). Therefore under Scott, if a trial court decides before trial
not to impose jail time, the defendant has no
[5] It is well established that the right to right to appointed counsel. Cf. Layton City
a jury trial is triggered by the type of pun- v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah CtApp.
ishment a defendant faces. See, e.g., Lezvis 1997) (noting Scott applies after-the-fact test
v. U.S., — U.S.
,
, 116 S.Ct. 2163, to determine if defendant had constitutional
2167, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996) (noting Su- right to appointed counsel). Similarly, in
preme Court case-law has established that this case, once the trial court agreed to elimiwhen defendant is charged with petty crime nate jail time from its sentencing options, it
carrying maximum six month prison term, no longer was required under Utah law to
Constitution does not guarantee right to grant McDonald's request for a jury trial.3
jury trial). Section 77-l-6(2)(e) reflects this
general rule by providing for a jury trial
II. Section 77-l-6(2)(e)
except when a defendant is charged with an
[8-10] McDonald also asks us to find that
infraction and therefore cannot possibly be
section 77-l-6(2)(e)4 violates the Utah Consentenced to prison. Once the charging institution because the Constitution provides
formation was amended to an infraction, Mcfor a jury trial in all criminal proceedings,5
Donald faced no possibility of jail time and whereas section 77-l-6(2)(e) does not allow
thus had no right to a jury trial.
jury trials in infraction cases. After review[6, 7] McDonald also argues the City had ing the record, however, we find McDonald
no right to charge her with an infraction failed to properly raise this state constituwhen state law provides that the offense is a tional issue before the trial court. None of
misdemeanor.2 We view the issue different- McDonald's motions before the trial court
ly. By accepting the amended information refers to this constitutional argument, nor is
2. McDonald cites section 41-6-16, which requires traffic laws to be enforced uniformly
throughout the state See Utah Code Ann. § 4 1 6-16 (1993). However, this statute does not
address the issue presented here—whether a trial
court may allow an information charging a defendant with a speeding violation to be amended
from a misdemeanor to an infraction.
3. We note the United States Supreme Court has
not determined whether the right to a jury trial
may be eliminated if a judge agrees before trial
to impose a sentence of less than six months.
See Lewis v. United States,
U.S.
,
,
116 S.Ct. 2163, 2168, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996)
However, we need not address whether the
judge's commitment to impose no jail time violated McDonald's Constitutional right to a jury in

this case because that right did not attach since
even a class C misdemeanor in Utah carries less
than six months imprisonment. See infra, note
6.
4. Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(2)(e) (1995) provides: "No person shall be convicted unless by
verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate." (Emphasis added.)
5. Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel
[and] to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury.. ."
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the argument raised in the court proceedings
for which we have transcripts. When an
appellant does not brief a state constitutional
argument below, this court will not address
it, but rather will analyze the alleged violation under the Federal Constitution. See
State v. Dudley, 847 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah
Ct.App.1993) ("Because appellants failed to
develop any meaningful state constitutional
argument below, our analysis must proceed
solely under federal constitutional law.").
[11-13] The United States Supreme
Court has held that a defendant charged with
a petty offense has no constitutional right to
a jury trial. See, e.g., Lewis u United
States,
U.S.
, 116 S.Ct. 2163,
;
2166, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996). Further, "it is
now settled that a legislature's determination
that an offense carries maximum prison
terms of six months or less indicates its view
that an offense is 'petty/ " Id. at
, 116
S.Ct. at 2167. Because an infraction carries
no prison term under Utah law, it is a petty
offense.6 Thus, section 77-l-6(2)(e) does not
violate the right to a jury trial guaranteed
under the Federal Constitution.
CONCLUSION
We hold the trial court's decision to allow
the City to amend the information charging
McDonald with a speeding violation from a
class C misdemeanor to an infraction did not
violate Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further, we hold that when
the trial court accepted the amended information, it effectively agreed not to sentence
McDonald to jail, and consequently McDonald did not have a right to a jury trial
under Utah law. Finally, we conclude section 77-l-6(2)(e) does not violate the right to
a jury trial guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. We therefore affirm McDonald's
conviction.
DAVIS, P.J., and WILKINS, Associate
P.J., concur.
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Defendant was convicted, in the Fifth
District Court, St. George Department,
James L. Shumate, J., of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute
and arranging to distribute a controlled substance. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, 924 P.2d 366, affirmed the conviction but vacated the enhanced sentence and
remanded for resentencing. On remand, the
District Court imposed an enhanced sentence. Defendant appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Wilkins, Associate P.J., held that:
(1) Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is not
violated by statutory requirement that sentencing judge, rather than jury, makes factual determination as to whether offense was
committed in concert with two or more people, as required for sentence enhancement,
and (2) evidence supported sentencing
judge's finding that defendant acted in concert with two other people in arranging to
distribute controlled substance.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <3=>1144.13(2.1)
On appeal, facts are considered in light
most favorable to jury's verdict.
2. Criminal Law <S=>1144.17,1158(1)
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To successfully challenge sentencing
judge's finding that defendant acted in con6. We note that under United States Supreme
Court case law, a class C misdemeanor in Utah is
also a petty offense because it carries a maximum prison term of six months or less. There-

fore, McDonald would not have had a right to a
jury trial under the Federal Constitution even if
the trial court had not allowed the charging
information to be amended to an infraction.

